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Missouri's Interfacing of the First
Amendment and the Right of Publicity: Is
the "Predominant Purpose" Test Really That
Desirable?
Doe v. TCI Cablevision'
I. INTRODUCTION
Many jurisdictions have struggled with the difficult question of how
they should interface the interest of a celebrity in his or her right of publicity
and the interest society holds in the freedom of artistic expression. The
United States Supreme Court has not definitively addressed this issue, and, as
a result, the approach to dealing with these types of First Amendment claims
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
This Note examines how the Missouri Supreme Court recently con-
fronted this issue. To appreciate the court's analysis, it is important to under-
stand the interests that the right of publicity seeks to protect and how courts in
other jurisdictions have dealt with this First Amendment issue. This Note
examines the interests protected by, and the elements of, a right of publicity
action and the various approaches articulated for dealing with the First
Amendment issue. This Note also examines the potential practical implica-
tions of the test the Missouri Supreme Court chose to adopt for dealing with
First Amendment questions in a right of publicity context.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1992, Todd McFarlane ("McFarlane") created the comic book enti-
tled Spawn.2 McFarlane, "an avowed hockey fan," admitted that he some-
times named his comic book characters after professional hockey players.3
One such character was Anthony "Tony Twist" Twistelli, a fictional villain
named after former N.H.L. "enforcer" Tony Twist ("Twist").4
1. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
2. Id. at 366. The Spawn comic book is about a CIA assassin who, after being
killed by the Mafia and descending to hell, made a deal with the devil and returned to
earth as a new creature, Spawn, where he was "to commit various violent and sexual
acts on the devil's behalf." Id.
3. Id. at 366-67.
4. Id. The fictional Tony Twist character is a murderous Mafia don who has
also been known to abduct children and have sex with prostitutes. Id. at 366. While
this fictional character bore no resemblance to Tony Twist, the hockey player, aside
from the fact they were both known as "enforcers," McFarlane stated in a 1994 issue
1
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In 1997, Twist first became aware that a character bearing his name ex-
isted in the Spawn comic book . In October of that year, Twist brought, inter
alia, a misappropriation of name action against McFarlane and various com-
panies connected to the comic book. 6 Twist argued that McFarlane had bene-
fited through the use of his name and, by associating Twist's name with a
villainous character, diminished its endorsement value.7 As a result, Twist
sought damages in the amount that the defendants should have paid him for
using his name and for the loss in endorsement value attached to his name.
8
After the suit was filed, McFarlane and the other defendants filed mo-
tions for summary judgment on First Amendment grounds, but these motions
were denied. 9 The case proceeded to trial where McFarlane argued that the
Tony Twist character was not a misappropriation of Twist's identity.'
0
McFarlane also denied that he or the other defendants gained any advantage
through the use of Twist's name." Twist countered by presenting evidence
that McFarlane directly targeted hockey fans with hockey products bearing
the Spawn logo and the sponsorship of a "Spawn Night" at a minor league
hockey game.12 The jury ultimately agreed with Twist and returned a $24.5
million verdict in Twist's favor.'
3
Following the verdict, the circuit court entered a judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict because Twist had failed to make a submissible case on his
misappropriation of name claim.' 4 The circuit court said Twist failed to es-
tablish the commercial advantage element of his cause of action because no
evidence showed that the defendants "intended (1) 'to injure Twist's market-
ability,' (2) 'to capitalize on the market recognition of the name,' or (3) 'de-
rived any pecuniary benefit whatsoever from the use of that name."'"5 After
of Spawn and in a 1996 trade magazine article that the fictional character was named
after the professional hockey player. Id. at 366-67.
5. Id. at 367.
6. Id.
7. Id. A former sports nutrition executive testified that his company revoked a
$100,000 endorsement offer to Twist after they learned he was associated with an evil
character in the comic book. Id.
8. Id. at 368.
9. Id. at 367.
10. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, No. ED78785, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 1577, at *10
(Mo. Ct. App. July 23, 2002) aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo.
2003) (en banc).
11. Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 367.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 367-68.
14. Id. at 368.
15. Id. at 370.
[Vol. 69
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the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri affirmed the circuit
court's decision,16 the Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer. 17
The high court held that Twist's complaint stated a "right of publicity"
action as opposed to a name misappropriation suit. 8 As a result, the court
granted Twist a new trial, holding that he made a submissible case on a right
of publicity action because there was sufficient evidence to show "(1) [t]hat
defendant used plaintiff's name as a symbol of his identity (2) without con-
sent (3) and with the intent to obtain a commercial advantage."' 19 The court
further held that Twist's claim was not barred by the First Amendment even
if McFarlane's work contained some expressive elements because the




The "right of publicity" action has its historical underpinnings in the
cause of action for misappropriation of name. The general definitions of the
two torts are similar in that they both require a misappropriation of another's
identity for the purpose of gaining an advantage without obtaining that
21party's consent. Some jurisdictions have yet to formally distinguish the
two.
22
For those jurisdictions that have drawn a distinction, the difference lies
in the type of harm the plaintiff can claim she has suffered. 23 In name misap-
propriation actions, the harm suffered can be both pecuniary and emotional.24
In right of publicity actions, the harm suffered must be a commercial loss.25
16. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, No. ED78785, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 1577, at *1
(Mo. Ct. App. July 23, 2002) affd in part & rev'd in part, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo.
2003) (en banc).
17. Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 365.
18. Id. at 368.
19. Id. at 369-72.
20. Id. at 374.
21. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) ("One who
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.") with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) ("One who appropriates the commercial value of a
person's identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indi-
cia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate
under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49.").
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b.
23. Id.
24. Bear Foot, Inc. v. Chandler, 965 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998);
Haith v. Model Cities Health Corp. of Kansas City, 704 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1079 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911).
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. a (stating the rule
is "limited to the redress of commercial injuries") (emphasis added).
2004]
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The reason for this distinction can be found in the relationship between the
two torts and the different interests they protect.
A. Relationship Between Misappropriation of Name
and Right of Publicity
Name misappropriation actions are claims for an invasion of one's pri-
vacy.26 Early formulations of the tort recognized misappropriation of one's
identity as an invasion of privacy because:
a man has the right to pass through this world, if he wills, without
having his picture published, his business enterprises discussed, his
successful experiments written up for the benefit of others, or his
eccentricities commented upon either in handbills, circulars, cata-
logues, periodicals, or newspapers; and, necessarily, that the things
which may not be written and published of him must not be spoken
of him by his neighbors, whether the comment be favorable or oth-
27
erwise.
Given this foundation in protecting a privacy interest, it was said that a victim
not only suffered loss through another's commercial misappropriation of her
identity, but also suffered loss in the form of "enjoyment of life and the exer-
cise of liberty., 28 Thus, courts treated emotional distress as part of the dam-
age suffered by a victim of this name misappropriation.
29
One might argue, however, that those already in the limelight would not
be as quick as others to suffer emotional distress over things such as having
their picture published. In line with this premise, the Fifth Circuit, in O'Brien
v. Pabst Sales Co.,3 held that a famous football player could not claim he
suffered an invasion of his privacy when one of his publicity photos was used
in a beer advertisement without his consent because "[he] was an outstanding
national football figure and had completely publicized his name and his pic-
tures." 31 The majority carefully pointed out that they were only dealing with
a case involving a claim for personal injury associated with a loss of privacy,
and not a claim to recover the commercial value for the use of the plaintiff's
26. Sullivan v. Pulitizer Broad. Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
27. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902),
superceded by, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (Consol. 1909).
28. Munden, 134 S.W. at 1079.
29. Bear Foot, 965 S.W.2d at 389; Haith, 704 S.W.2d at 688; Munden, 134 S.W.
at 1079. See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1977)
("[P]rotection of his personal feelings against mental distress is an important factor
leading to a recognition of the rule . .
30. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
31. Id. at 169-70.
[Vol. 69
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name in the advertisement.32 However, the dissent remained concerned that
the majority's holding would leave all those who have achieved a certain
degree of popularity and seek publicity without remedy when advertisers
"seize upon such popularity to increase their sales of any lawful article with-
out compensation of any kind for such commercial use of one's name and
fame."
33
The Second Circuit shared the concerns of the O'Brien dissenters when
it had to deal with a similar situation in Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.3 4 It recognized that while celebrities may not suffer a
high level of emotional harm when their identities are misappropriated, celeb-
rities nevertheless need some type of protection from such activities. There-
fore, the court drew a distinction between those misappropriation actions
where a plaintiff sought protection of her privacy interest and those misap-
propriation actions where a plaintiff sought only to protect her commercial
interest in the exclusive use of her identity.35 That court was the first to for-
mally recognize a distinction between the two actions, 36 deeming the latter
claim a "right of publicity." 37 This distinction has since been recognized by
courts in other jurisdictions38 as well as by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition.39
Because these two torts are similar, analysis of the name misappropria-
tion tort remains important in establishing the elements of its progeny-the
right of publicity.40 Name misappropriation occurs when the defendant: (i)
uses of the plaintiff's identity, (ii) without consent, (iii) to gain some advan-
tage.41 Therefore, after applying the previously mentioned distinction to the
advantage element,42 a right of publicity action arises when the defendant: (i)
uses the plaintiff's identity, (ii) without consent, (iii) to gain a commercial
advantage.43
32. Id. at 170.
33. Id. at 171 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
35. Id. at 868.
36. Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of
Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 471, 478 (2003).
37. Id.
38. Bear Foot, Inc. v. Chandler, 965 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995).
40. See id.
41. Nemani v. St. Louis Univ., 33 S.W.3d 184, 185 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
42. Haelen Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953).
43. See e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837
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B. Analysis of the Right of Publicity Elements
In applying the three elements of a right of publicity action, courts have
taken special care to articulate what "plaintiffs identity" consists of44 and
what constitutes "gaining a commercial advantage.
'AS
1. Identity
Misappropriation of another's identity has not been limited to cases
where the defendant used the plaintiff's actual name or literal image.46
Rather, courts have held that a person's identity can be appropriated in any
number of ways, "'such as the use of a name, nickname, voice, picture, per-
forming style, distinctive characteristics or other indicia closely associated
with the person.",47 Relevant evidence of the identity element has been said
to include things such as "the nature and extent of the identifying characteris-
tics used by the defendant, the defendant's intent, the fame of the plaintiff,
evidence of actual identification made by third persons, and surveys or other
evidence indicating the perceptions of the audience.
' 4s
Several cases illustrate the breadth of actions that constitute misappro-
priating another's identity. The Ninth Circuit held that Vanna White stated a
claim in her complaint over an advertisement that depicted a robot standing
next to a Wheel of Fortune type gameboard while wearing clothing and jew-
elry similar to that worn by Vanna on the show.4 9 The Ninth Circuit also
sustained Bette Midler's claim that Ford appropriated her identity by having a
voice similar to hers singing in the background of a television advertise-
ment. 50 The Sixth Circuit held that Johnny Carson stated a claim for misap-
propriation when a company incorporated his show's catch phrase by naming
itself "Here's Johnny Portable Toilets."51 Football player Elroy "Crazylegs"
Hirsch's complaint that S.C. Johnson & Son appropriated his identity by
naming one of its products "Crazylegs" was sustained by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court.
52
44. See e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398-99 (9th.
Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988); Carson, 698
F.2d at 835.
45. See e.g., Benavidez v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir.
1989); Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594 (N.D. Tex 1999).
46. See Carson, 698 F.2d at 835 ("Carson's identity may be exploited even if his
name, John W. Carson, or his picture is not used.").
47. Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (quoting Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece,
950 F. Supp. 783, 801 (S.D. Tex. 1996), rev'd, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998)).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (1995).
49. White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
50. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1988).
51. Carson, 698 F.2d at 836.
52. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 140 (Wis. 1979).
[Vol. 69
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In addition to establishing that his identity was appropriated, to state a
right of publicity cause of action the plaintiff must also show that the misap-
propriation was done to gain a commercial advantage.3 To satisfy the com-
mercial advantage element, the facts must establish that the misappropriation
was done with the actual intent of gaining a commercial advantage.14 That
the defendant may have received incidental benefits as a result of his actions
is not enough.55
For example, in Benavidez v. Anheuser Busch, Inc.,56 the plaintiff's
identity was appropriated without his consent to the defendant's commercial
advantage, but the plaintiff was nonetheless denied a cause of action. In
Benavidez, Anheuser-Busch ("ABI") produced a historical documentary on
Hispanic Congressional Medal of Honor recipients.5 7 Without first obtaining
his consent, ABI included a segment depicting the heroic actions of the plain-
tiff.58 The film was made available "to schools, government agencies, veter-
ans organizations, and Hispanic organizations." 59 The film was also shown at
ABI hospitality centers where people could sit and watch the film while en-
joying free ABI products. 60 The plaintiff argued that he stated a claim be-
cause ABI's film was "much more than a mere documentary" insofar as it
was shown at hospitality centers along side company logos and free beer.6'
He argued that ABI was attempting to capitalize on his good name and repu-
tation.62
The Fifth Circuit disagreed. It reasoned that ABI might have enjoyed
increased goodwill in the Hispanic community resulting from the production
and showing of the film, but the film was not produced with the intent of
boosting sales.63 Any commercial benefit gained was purely incidental, and,
therefore, the plaintiff did not state a claim.64
However, aside from this limitation, the showing required to establish
intent remains relatively insubstantial. First, it is irrelevant whether the de-
fendant actually realized a commercial advantage through the use of the
53. See e.g., Carson, 698 F.2d at 835; Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 134.
54. Wendt v. Host Int'l Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1997).
55. Benavidez v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1989).
56. 873 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1989).
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plaintiff's name or likeness.65 Second, courts have held that to establish in-
tent, the defendant must only have intended to catch the consumer's eye.
66
One illustrative case, Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp.,67 involved
a claim brought by former basketball star Kareem Abdul-Jabbar ("Abdul-
Jabbar") over the use of his former name, Lew Alcindor, in a GMC commer-
cial airing during the 1993 NCAA basketball tournament.68 The ad did not
make it appear that Abdul-Jabbar endorsed any GMC product. Instead, it
simply used his name as the answer to a trivia question.69 The commercial
asked the audience, "'Who holds the record for being voted the most out-
standing player of this tournament?' 70 Abdul-Jabbar's former name was then
printed on the screen as the correct answer. 71 The answer was followed by a
second question, "'Has any car made the "Consumer Digest's Best Buy" list
more than once?' ' ' 72 The response to the second question was that a GMC
product had.73 Based on these facts, the Ninth Circuit held that Abdul-Jabbar
stated a claim because "[t]o the extent GMC's use of the plaintiff's birth
name attracted television viewers' attention, GMC gained a commercial ad-
vantage.,
74
Another such case, Henley v. Dillard Department Stores,75 involved an
action brought by rock star Don Henley over the use of his name in a Dil-
lard's clothing advertisement for a shirt known as a "henley." 76 In the ad,
Dillard's placed a picture of a man wearing the shirt with an arrow pointing to
his head and another arrow pointing to the shirt.77 Beside the arrow pointing
to his head were the words "'This is Don." '78 Beside the arrow pointing to the
shirt were the words "'This is Don's henley."' 79 Based on this advertisement,
the court found the commercial advantage element had been met because the
"[d]efendant's sophisticated and experienced ad creators described the benefit
65. Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (N.D. Tex 1999)
("The plaintiff in a right to publicity action is not required to show that the defendant
made money off the commercial use of the name or likeness, as Defendant sug-
gests.").
66. Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 415 (9th Cir. 1996);
Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
67. 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996).






74. Id. at 415.
75. 46 F. Supp. 2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
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they received as being able to catch the eye of the consumer and make the ad
more interesting."
80
C. First Amendment Protections
Even if the plaintiff is able to establish all of the elements of a right of
publicity action, her claim will be barred if the defendant's actions are pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Because the United States Supreme Court
has not yet adopted a definitive approach,8' the issue of whether the use of
another's identity is protected speech remains in flux. To deal with this prob-
lem, courts and legal commentators have articulated several approaches.
1. The Restatement's "Related Use" Test
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition offers a test examining
whether the use of another's name or likeness is somehow related to that per-
son.8 2 If the use is sufficiently related to that person, the speech is pro-
83tected . If the use is solely to attract attention to a work not related to or
about that person, the speech is unprotected.84 However, "[t]he fact that the
publisher or other user seeks or is successful in obtaining a commercial ad-
vantage from an otherwise permitted use of another's identity does not render
the appropriation actionable." 85 Examples of this type of speech are the use
of a person's name or identity in a news broadcast, book, movie, or play
about that person.86  The Restatement offers the following illustration of a
situation where a plaintiff's right of publicity action would be defeated by theFirst Amendment because the use is related to or about the complaining party:
80. Id. at 597.
81. The only U.S. Supreme Court case to deal with this was Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), but the Court limited its holding to
the facts of that case. Id. at 578-79.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. An excellent illustration of the underlying reasoning for this principle
can be seen in Falwell v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va.
1981). Reverend Falwell felt he was entitled to damages because Penthouse pub-
lished an interview of him against his wishes purely for the purposes of increasing
magazine sales. Id. at 1206. The court said the mere fact that the interview was pub-
lished to increase sales does not defeat First Amendment protection. Id. at 1209. The
court reasoned that "[o]bviously, everything that appears in a magazine is placed with
the intention of increasing sales." Id. at 1210. If that alone were sufficient to defeat
First Amendment protections, there would be an intrusion "on important constitu-
tional freedoms, which guarantee the uninhibited dissemination of ideas." Id.
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c.
2004]
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A is the subject of an unauthorized biography published by
B. The biography is entitled "A" and contains a photograph
of A on the dust jacket. The biography contains numerous
false statements concerning facts and incidents in A's life.
B has not infringed A's right to publicity. Whether B is sub-
ject to liability to A for the false statements contained in the
biography is determined under the rules governing liability
for defamation or invasion of privacy by placing another in a
false light.
8 7
In contrast, the following situation offers an illustration of a plaintiff
who would have a right of publicity cause action because the use of that per-
son's identity is not related to or about her:
A is an actress. B, a pharmaceutical company, publishes
without consent an advertisement containing a photograph
showing A as she appeared in one of her motion pictures,
with simulated dialogue discussing one of B's products. B
is subject to liability to A for infringement of A's right of
publicity .... 88
2. The California "Transformative Use" Test
California courts have used a different test, looking to see whether the
use of the complaining party's identity was transformative in that it contained
a significant expressive element.8 9 When the use contains a significant ex-
pressive element, the work receives First Amendment protection.
90
An application of this test can be seen in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc.,g9 a dispute over an unauthorized charcoal drawing of the
Three Stooges which had been reproduced in lithographs and on silk screen
T-shirts.92 In dealing with the First Amendment issue raised by the defen-
dant, the California Supreme Court stated that the critical inquiry was
"whether a product containing a celebrity's likeness is so transformed that it
has become primarily the defendant's own expression rather than the celeb-
rity's likeness." 93 In other words, in cases where the "celebrity likeness is
one of the 'raw materials' from which an original work is synthesized," the
87. Id. § 47 cmt. c, illus. 6.
88. Id. § 47 cmt. a, illus. 1.
89. Comedy III Prods., Inc v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001).
90. Id.
91. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
92. Id. at 800-01.
93. Id. at 809.
[Vol. 69
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use of the celebrity likeness is protected under the First Amendment.94 How-
ever, when "the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and
substance of the work in question," such as a drawing that is nothing more
than a literal reproduction of a celebrity's image, the use would not be pro-
tected and a right of publicity action would lie.95 In close cases, a subsidiary,
but non-determinative, inquiry is whether "the marketability and economic
value of the challenged work derive[d] primarily from the fame of the celeb-
rity depicted." 96 The court said that celebrity images such as those created by
Andy Warhol may be sufficiently transformative because they "convey[ed] a
message that went beyond the commercial exploitation of celebrity images
and became a form of ironic social comment on the dehumanization of celeb-
rity itself.",97 However, the court found that the drawings at issue in Comedy
III were not sufficiently transformative because they were simply "literal,
conventional depictions of the Three Stooges so as to exploit their fame."
98
Winter v. DC Comics" illustrates a situation in which the California Su-
preme Court did find a work to be sufficiently transformative.1° ° The plain-
tiffs, two well-known musicians named Johnny and Edgar Winter, com-
plained that DC Comics had appropriated their names and likenesses by cre-
ating two comic book characters named Johnny and Edgar Autumn.' 0 ' Their
allegations were:
that the defendants selected the names Johnny and Edgar
Autumn to signal readers the Winter brothers were being
portrayed; that the Autumn brothers were drawn with long
white hair and albino features similar to plaintiffs'; that the
Johnny Autumn character was depicted as wearing a tall
black top hat similar to the one Johnny Winter often wore;
and that the title of volume 4, Autumns of Our Discontent,
refers to the famous Shakespearian phrase, "the winter of
our discontent."'
0 2
The court nevertheless held the work to be protected by the First
Amendment because there was sufficient expressive content.10 3 The court
reasoned that "[a]lthough the fictional characters... are less-than-subtle evo-
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 810.
97. Id. at 811.
98. Id. A copy of the picture in question is included in the appendix to the case.
Id. app. at 811.
99. 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
100. Id. at 473.
101. Id. at 476.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 479.
2004]
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cations of Johnny and Edgar Winter ... [the] plaintiffs [were] merely part of
the raw materials from which the comic books [were] synthesized.' 1 4 Any
depictions of the plaintiffs were more along the lines of parody or caricature,
and the Autumn brothers were only characters in a larger, quite expressive
overall story.l°5 That the defendants may have used the plaintiffs' likenesses
and reputations to generate interest and increase comic book sales was irrele-
vant because the work was sufficiently transformative. 106
A meaningful distinction can be drawn between these two cases. Be-
cause the work of art in Comedy III was a literal depiction of the Three
Stooges, the artist was essentially just selling Three Stooges pictures to de-
voted fans. 107 In Winter, the fans were not just buying pictures of the Winter
brothers.108 Instead they were buying comic books that "depict[ed] fanciful,
creative characters."'1
0 9
3. The "Predominant Purpose" Test
Intellectual property litigator Mark Lee ("Lee") has recently suggested a
different approach to dealing with the First Amendment issue. Lee expresses
concern about the premise that products being sold to predominantly exploit
the commercial value of another's identity may be considered by some as
protected speech due to the presence of expressive content.' 10 Lee argues that
the fairest approach to this issue is a balancing test that looks at the predomi-
nant purpose behind the use of another's identity.' 1 Under his test, if the
predominant purpose was to exploit the commercial value of another's iden-
tity, the use should not be protected even though some expressive content
exists. 12 If the predominant purpose behind the work was expressive com-
mentary, the expressive values under the balancing test should receive greater
weight and, in turn, there would be a better argument for First Amendment
protection. 113
104. Id.
105. Id. The Court likened the comic books to "the trading cards caricaturing and
parodying prominent baseball players that have received First Amendment protec-
tion." Id. (citations omitted).




109. Id. at 480.
110. Lee, supra note 36, at 498-500.
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In this action, the Missouri Supreme Court reviewed the circuit court's
grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") following a jury
trial for a misappropriation of name suit.1 14 While the jury found for the
plaintiff at the trial level, 115 the court granted the defendants' JNOV motion
on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to make a submissible claim on the
commercial advantage element of the tort.1 16 More specifically, the court
held that there was a lack of evidence to establish that the defendants "in-
tended (1) 'to injure Twist's marketability,' (2) 'to capitalize on the market
recognition of the name,' or (3) 'derived any pecuniary benefit whatsoever
from the use of that name."'
' 117
Twist was not seeking to recover damages for any emotional distress
caused by the use of his name in the Spawn comic book;" 8 the damages he
sought were strictly commercial. 19 Therefore, the court held that Twist's
action was more appropriately labeled a right of publicity claim, a point both
parties conceded in their briefs. 1
20
The court quickly pointed out that the elements of a name misappropria-
tion action and a right of publicity action are basically the same. 121 The court
found that the only real difference between the two was that in a right of pub-
licity action the plaintiff must prove the misappropriation was made to
achieve a commercial advantage. Because the elements of the two claims
are so similar, the court looked at Missouri name misappropriation cases to
articulate what the critical elements in a Missouri right of publicity action
should be.' 23 In view of these cases and the tort's definition in the Restate-
ment (Third) of Unfair Competition, the court identified three things that a
plaintiff must show to state a claim for right of publicity: "(1) [t]hat defendant
used plaintiff's name as a symbol of his identity (2) without consent (3) and
with the intent to obtain a commercial advantage."'
124
In analyzing the first element, the court disagreed with the defendants'
assertion that the mere use of the common name did not constitute a misap-
propriation of Twist's identity.' 25 The court stated that the fact both charac-
ters shared the same unusual name and "tough guy [personas] create[d] an
114. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 365 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 369.
117. Id. at 370.




122. Id. at 369.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 370.
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unmistakable correlation between Twist the hockey player and Twist the Ma-
fia don that ... conclusively establishe[d] that [defendants] used his name
and identity."' 126 Therefore, the court held that Twist presented sufficient evi-
dence to show "his name [had been] used as a symbol of his identity."' 127
On the commercial advantage element, the element upon which JNOV
was granted, 128 the court found that the trial court had taken into account ir-
relevant factors in reaching its conclusion.' 29 The trial court looked at
whether the defendants intended to actually injure Twist and whether the
defendants actually gained a commercial advantage by using his name.
30
The supreme court held that a showing of those factors was not required.'13
There was no need to show intent to injure the plaintiff personally, nor was
there a need to show that the defendants were actually successful in their ven-
ture to gain a commercial advantage.' 32 All that was required was a showing
by Twist that the defendants intended to obtain a commercial advantage by
using his name. 133 This showing could be satisfied by establishing that the
defendants' use of Twist's name was an attempt to attract consumer attention
to their products.' 34 The court found that evidence of the defendants' state-
ments and actions in producing and marketing the comic book reflected at
least some intent to convey the idea that Twist was somehow associated with
the comic book. 35 Therefore, Twist had established the commercial advan-
tage element of the tort. 
136
Having determined that Twist established a submissible right of public-
ity claim, the court turned its attention to the First Amendment defense raised
by the defendants. 37 The court identified three distinct ways this issue could
be analyzed: 1) by examining the relationship between the use of the per-
son's identity and the person herself ("related use" test), 2) by examining
whether the use of the person's identity was transformative to the point of
being expressive ("transformative use" test), or 3) by examining whether the
predominant purpose behind the misappropriation was to gain a commercial
advantage ("predominant purpose" test).' 38 Identifying the strengths and
weakness of each method, the court found that the first two afforded too little
protection to the interests of the celebrity because they "operate to preclude a
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 369.
129. Id. at 371.
130. Id. at 370.





136. Id. at 372.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 373-74.
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cause of action whenever the use of the name and identity is in any way ex-
pressive, regardless of its commercial exploitation."' 39 For this reason, the
court chose to adopt the "predominant purpose" test, stating that mere pres-
ence of expressive content does not automatically entitle a defendant to First
Amendment protection. 140 Instead, First Amendment protection should only
be available when the predominant purpose of a misappropriation was to
make an expressive comment.141
Applying the "predominant purpose test" to the present case, the court
held that use of Twist's name in the comic book was not protected speech.
142
The court stated that the use of Twist's name was "predominantly a ploy to
sell comic books and related products rather than an artistic or literary expres-




The commercial use of celebrities is a big business, and it seems to be
getting even bigger. 144 In 1984, basketball player Michael Jordan signed an
endorsement contract with Nike worth $2.5 million. 145 As substantial as this
amount seems, it is relatively modest when compared to the $90 million en-
dorsement contract eighteen-year-old basketball player LeBron James re-
cently received from the same company.146 Not all celebrities have the fame
necessary to command such a sum, but these figures show that allowing oth-
ers to use their identities commercially can be a significant source of income.
The Missouri Supreme Court recognized that celebrities need legal protection
for this valuable interest and granted it in the form of right of publicity suits.
From a fairness standpoint, right of publicity suits, on their face, appear
desirable. Smart celebrities work hard to maintain a marketable image, 147 and
it would be unjust to allow another person to capitalize on that value without
first compensating the party responsible for creating it. Also, because the
state of one's reputation can be such a determinative factor regarding a celeb-





144. See The Cash Register: Putting a Finger on the Pulse of the Money That
Really Matters, ENT. WKLY., June 6, 2003, at 19.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Dru Sefton, Best Bet for Celebs: Get Advice Before PR Crisis, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Aug. 24, 2003, at E5. See also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971
F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Considerable energy and ingenuity are expended by
those who have achieved celebrity value to exploit it for profit.").
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rity's potential earning ability, 148 he should not be left to stand idly by while
his reputation is being tarnished through an unwitting association with an
undesirable product. The potential harm from a damaged reputation may be
limited to losing one or two small endorsements, but it could also affect one's
entire career. For example, imagine what would happen if a highly contro-
versial organization, such as a racial hate group, were allowed to portray,
without consent or recourse, movie-star "A" as an organization spokesperson.
Following the certain public backlash, "A" would probably lose many en-
dorsements and probably have trouble getting cast in any future movie roles.
It is true that "A" could use his celebrity status to take elaborate steps outside
of the legal arena to make it known that he does not hold such beliefs; how-
ever, the allegations alone may have done irreparable damage.1
49
In applying the elements of a right of publicity action, there should be
some leeway in the standards for determining what constitutes a misappro-
priation of another's identity to gain a commercial advantage. In addition to
their names or images, many celebrities have other tell-tale signs that make
any reference to them easily identifiable. Advertisers can use such tell-tale
signs to draw reference to these celebrities without ever using their names or
literal images. The following example is illustrative:
Consider a hypothetical advertisement which depicts a me-
chanical robot with male features, an African-American
complexion, and a bald head. The robot is wearing black
high top Air Jordon basketball sneakers, and a red basketball
uniform with black trim, baggy shorts, and the number 23
(though not revealing "Bulls" or "Jordon" lettering). The ad
depicts the robot dunking a basketball one-handed, stiff-
armed, legs extended like open scissors, and tongue hanging
out. Now envision that this ad is run on television during
professional basketball games. Considered individually, the
robot's physical attributes, its dress, and its stance tell us lit-
tle. Taken together, they lead to the only conclusion that
any sports viewer who has registered a discemable pulse in
the past five years would reach: the ad is about Michael Jor-
dan.' 5
0
If such actions were not considered a breach of the right of publicity, the tort
would offer essentially no protection at all.
148. See Sefton, supra note 147.
149. Take, for instance, the situation O.J. Simpson has faced since he stood trial
for murder. Although he was found not guilty, the criminal trial still damaged his
reputation to the point that one reputation management professional referred to him as
"the walking dead" because of his inability to make money. Id.
150. White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
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However, sitting opposite of the celebrity's valid interest in protecting
the commercial value of his identity is society's interest in promoting free-
dom of artistic expression. The easy cases are those where the use of an-
other's identity is strictly commercial.15 1 More difficult are those cases where
there is both a commercial and artistic purpose behind the use.1 52 Where to
draw the line has proven to be a difficult task for the various courts dealing
with this issue. The "related use" and "transformative use" tests appear to
protect artistic expression more. But the Missouri Supreme Court, through its
adoption of the "predominant purpose" test, appears to favor protecting the
celebrity.
Through use of the "predominant purpose" test, the court is attempting
to achieve what it considers a more appropriate balance by truly getting to the
heart of the matter. 53 This attempt is amicable because one can easily imag-
ine the situations where the rationale for a right of publicity action suggests
there should be a cause of action, but due to borderline expressive elements
the claim is defeated. Twist's claim may have been doomed to fall in this
category had the court applied a test other than the "predominant purpose"
test. Given the strong factual consistency between Twist's claim and the
claim of the Winter brothers in Winter v. DC Comics,154 a California court
would likely have barred Twist's complaint. Such a result would seem ineq-
uitable in light of the fact that McFarlane apparently only used Twist's name
to attract attention to and increase sales of his comic book.'
55
One must wonder, though, whether the test, as articulated by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court, will be so desirable in situations outside the context of
this case. Many professional artists create truly expressive works of movie
stars, athletes, or political heroes. However, one can also imagine that for
many of these artists, the predominant purpose in creating such a work is
commercial. They make their living by selling their art, and therefore, the
underlying goal is to create a marketable product.
A real-life example of such a situation can be seen in ETW Corp. v.
Jireh Publishing, Inc.15 6 Artist Matt Rush ("Rush") created a painting enti-
tled The Masters of Augusta commemorating Tiger Woods' 1997 Masters
victory, making Woods the youngest player ever to achieve this feat. 157 The
painting depicted Woods in various poses, such as swinging a golf-club or
lining up a putt.' 58 In the background, paintings of other famous golfers of
151. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811
(Cal. 2001).
152. See, e.g., Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003).
153. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
154. 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003)
155. Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
156. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
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the past were depicted looking down on Woods from above. 59 Rush made
copies of the painting for the purpose of selling limited edition prints. 60
Rush's work was an expressive comment on a historic event in profes-
sional sports.16 If the predominant purpose behind his work was to profit by
selling the limited edition prints, would the Missouri Supreme Court never-
theless view this painting as unprotected speech? The Sixth Circuit, in ETW
Corp., realized that a holding to that effect would be unjust. The court rea-
soned that "[p]ermitting Woods's right of publicity to trump Rush's right of
freedom of expression would extinguish Rush's right to profit from his crea-
tive enterprise."' 162 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition also rec-
ognizes this concern, 163 as do the courts of California.
164
However, the Missouri Supreme Court's test seems to suggest that the
painting is not protected speech if Rush created the work with the ultimate
goal of realizing a profit. If this is truly how the test operates in situations
involving paintings like Rush's The Masters ofAugusta, one can imagine the
test will likely have the effect of chilling a great deal of artistic expression.
VI. CONCLUSION
One can assume that the goal of the Missouri Supreme Court in adopting
the "predominant purpose" test was to promote future acts of artistic expres-
sion. Therefore, potential application problems with this test are very fore-
seeable, especially in cases where professional artists exercise legitimate ex-
pression through the use of celebrity images. Mark Lee, the author of the
"predominant use" test, even recognized that it would be difficult to apply in
many circumstances. 16  How the court will go about accommodating such




161. Id. at 938.
162. Id.
163. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995).
164. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003).
165. Lee, supra note 36, at 501.
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